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MONETARY EXACTIONS: NOT JUST COMPENSATION?
THE EXPANSION OF NOLLAN AND DOLAN IN KOONTZ V
ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of private property embodied in the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
represents a principle that is fundamental to the rights and free-
doms the country's Founders sought to protect.' The notion that
property receives the utmost protection under the Constitution is a
common theme throughout Takings Clause jurisprudence and has
driven the United States Supreme Court to broaden the scope of
what constitutes property.2 Notably, property has been expanded
to include not only physical property, but also monetary property.3
A new era in Takings jurisprudence emerged with the Su-
preme Court's recognition in Nollan v. Calfonia Coastal Commis-
sion4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard5 that takings can arise from the
burdens imposed by land use permits.6 The "Nollan-Dolan" test
emerging from these cases states that conditions of permits must
have an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the impact
of the construction or development project proposed.7 While Nol-
Ian and Dolan are "takings cases," they also involve an application of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.8 The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine provides that "the government may not deny a
1. See Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical
Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far", 49 Am. U. L. REv. 181, 195-96 (1999) (discussing
Founders view that property protection was of paramount concern in writing
United States Constitution).
2. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (recognizing gov-
ernment regulations as takings).
3. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41 (1960) (recognizing
that government-held liens that diminished in value are compensable property in-
terest); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980)
(holding government-confiscated accrued interest constituted taking); Phillips v.
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 156-57 (1998) (finding income interest pay-
ment confiscation is taking).
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
6. See id. at 374-75 (holding conditions on permits that have "rough propor-
tionality" to development are not takings); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 84243 (recognizing
taking when government imposed condition on granting land use permit).
7. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (stating Nollan-Dolan test).
8. See id. at 385 (finding unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies when
individual is denied right to receive just compensation for property).
(465)
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benefit to a person because he exercise [d] a constitutional right."9
For example, the government must give landowners the opportu-
nity to receive just compensation for their land under the Fifth
Amendment and may not withhold that benefit.10
In a recent expansion of Nollan and Dolan, the United States
Supreme Court held in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District" that the government's denial of a land use permit that
would have allowed Coy Koontz to develop his property was an un-
constitutional condition and a taking, despite that none of Mr.
Koontz's land or money was physically taken. 12 The Court clarified
the Nollan-Dolan test, stating for the first time that the test must be
applied not only when a permit is approved with a condition, but
also when one is denied with a condition, even if the government
demands money rather than physical property.iS The Koontz deci-
sion took the Takings Clause a step further than Nollan and Dolan
because it found a taking where the government demanded "mone-
tary exactions" to offset the development's potential impact on
Florida's wetlands rather than a land use exaction in the form of
physical property.14 The Supreme Court found a taking in Koontz
because the government demands for money were "functionally
equivalent" to demands for physical property under the rationale
that they both "operate [d] upon or alter [ed] an identified property
interest."' 5 The Court further found an unconstitutional condition
imposed on Koontz because the action would have constituted a per
se taking had the government directly taken the money de-
manded.16 The government's imposition of a condition on a land
use permit denies the individual the right to receive just compensa-
tion for his or her land and is therefore unconstitutional.17
9. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)
(stating basic principle underlying unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
10. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2589
(2013) (stating unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies in situations involving
Takings Clause).
11. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (holding government's rejection of land use per-
mit is Takings Clause violation when property owner is denied opportunity to re-
ceive just compensation for property).
12. See id. (holding government demands for money constituted taking).
13. Id. (stating holding of case).
14. See id. at 2593 (discussing government demands during permitting pro-
cess).
15. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540
(1998)) (citation omitted) (explaining how Court finds taking in Koontz).
16. See id. at 2603 (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine to monetary
exactions).
17. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (holding denying
property owners right to receive just compensation is unconstitutional).
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The Supreme Court's determination that a government action
that denies a permit, but does not seize physical property, is a tak-
ing requires an extreme leap in the logical understanding of Tak-
ings Clause jurisprudence.18 Without clear direction from the
Court as to how to apply this new and expansive reading of Nollan
and Dolan, lower courts may struggle to find a balance between pro-
tecting property rights and protecting the community from poten-
tially harmful environmental effects of development.' 9 The Court's
expansion of Nollan and Dolan is particularly relevant to future local
governments attempting to mitigate the threat development poses
to the environment.20
This Note examines the Supreme Court's holding in Koontz
that monetary exactions added as a condition to approval of a land
use permit must satisfy the essential nexus and rough proportional-
ity test and predicts the potential effects of expanding Nollan and
Dolan on Takings Clause jurisprudence.2 1 Part II provides a factual
summary of Koontz.22 Part III describes the general background
and evolution of regulatory takings, with specific focus on land use
permits, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and monetary
exactions.23 Part IV reviews the Supreme Court's analysis in
Koontz. 24 Part V presents a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's
holding, specifically examining the relationship between outright
permit denials and takings, the Court's adoption of Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfe25 regarding takings in
the context of monetary confiscations, and the Court's application
of lien and interest income confiscations cases.26 Finally, Part VI
18. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2603 (holding Takings Clause is implicated
when government demand is for money and no taking of any kind has occurred).
19. See id. (failing to give direction in applying Court's holding).
20. See id. (purposely failing to acknowledge potential impact on environ-
ment).
21. For a narrative analysis of Koontz, see infra notes 125-184 and accompany-
ing text. For a critical analysis of Koontz, see infra notes 185-218 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of the relevant facts of Koontz, see infra notes 28-48 and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of relevant background information regarding Takings
Clause jurisprudence and related cases, see infra notes 49-123 and accompanying
text.
24. For a narrative analysis of the Court's decision in Koontz, see infra notes
124-184 and accompanying text.
25. 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding that arbitrary retroactive
law violated Takings Clause).
26. For a critical analysis of the Court's holding in Koontz, see infra notes 185-
218 and accompanying text.
467
3
Contino: Monetary Exactions: Not Just Compensation? The Expansion of  Noll
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
468 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XXV: p. 465
examines the decision's potential impact on Takings Clause juris-
prudence, local governments, and the environment.27
II. FACTS
In 1972, Coy Koontz, Sr. purchased 14.9 acres of undeveloped
land located just outside of Orlando, Florida.28 Koontz later sought
to develop 3.7 acres of the 14.9-acre tract.29 In order to proceed
with the development, in 1994, he applied for a Management and
Storage of Surface Water (MSSW) permit and a Wetlands Resource
Management permit.30 Florida law required landowners who
wished to develop their property to obtain a MSSW permit, which
could "impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure
that ... [construction would not be harmful to the water resources
of the District."31 Florida law also required that the proposed con-
struction not be "contrary to the public interest."32 The St. Johns
River Management District (the District), the district in which Mr.
Koontz's land was located, also "require[d] that permit applicants
wishing to build on wetlands offset the resulting environmental
damage by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands
elsewhere."33
Koontz's plan for development included elevating the north-
ern section of his land to in preparation for the construction of a
building.34 The development plan also included "grad[ing] the
27. For an analysis of the potential impact of Koontz, see infra notes 219-259
and accompanying text.
28. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013)
(noting when Koontz bought property).
29. Id. at 2591-92 (describing Koontz's property and proposed development).
The tract of undeveloped land was located south of Florida State Road 50. Id.
Although the state of Florida classified the land as wetlands, the topography of the
area is diverse and includes a "small creek, forested uplands, and wetlands." Id. at
2592.
30. Id. (describing steps Koontz took to develop his property).
31. Water Resources Act, FLA. STAT. § 373.413(1) (2012) [hereinafter WRA]
(stating specific instances that require permit); see also Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592
(describing applicable Florida statute on permits for construction or alteration).
The Water Resources Act (WRA) also created five water management districts in
Florida to regulate "construction that connects to, draws water from, drains water
into, or is placed in or across the waters in the state." Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592
(citation omitted). The St. Johns River Water Management District had jurisdic-
tion over Coy Koontz's land. Id.
32. Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 403.905(1)
(2013) [hereinafter Henderson Act] (stating purpose of Henderson Act); see also
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (discussing Henderson Act).
33. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (stating District requirements for land use
permit).
34. Id. (summarizing Koontz's development plan).
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land from the southern edge of the building site down to the eleva-
tion of the high-voltage electrical lines, and install[ing] a dry-bed
pond for retaining and gradually releasing stormwater runoff from
the building and its parking lot."35 To offset the environmental im-
pact of the development, Koontz proposed deeding the District an
eleven-acre section of his property as a conservation easement,
which would foreclose any future construction on the land.3 6
The District rejected Koontz's proposal, conditioning approval
on one of two possible options.37 Under the first option, Koontz
could decrease the size of his development to one acre, deed the
District the remaining 13.9 acres as a conservation easement, and
install a costly "subsurface stormwater management system beneath
the building site."3 8 Under the second option, Koontz could de-
velop his property as he proposed, but would be required to hire
contractors to enhance and improve District-owned land several
miles away.39 The specific improvements under option two in-
cluded "replac[ing] culverts on one parcel or fill [ing] in ditches on
another" and would have improved roughly fifty acres of District-
owned lands.40 District policy did not require a permit applicant to
improve a specific piece of land and allowed the District to require
an applicant to simply fund "offsite mitigation work."4 1
Koontz found the District's options for offsite environmental
mitigation excessive given the limited impact his planned building
would impose and filed suit against the District in Florida state
court.4 2 Koontz sought relief under a Florida statute that "al-
low[ed] owners to recover 'monetary damages' if a state agency's
action [was] 'an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power
constituting a taking without just compensation.' 4 3 The case went
35. Id. (providing details of Koontz's development proposal).
36. Id. (discussing proposed mitigation any environmental impact develop-
ment may have).
37. Id. at 2593 (discussing District's denial of proposed conservation
easement).
38. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (discussing District's first proposed concession).
The district also proposed that Koontz "install retaining walls rather than gradually
sloping the land from the building site down to the elevation of the rest of his
property to the south." Id.
39. Id. (discussing District's second proposed concession).
40. Id. (discussing specifics of District's second option).
41. Id. (making distinction that District never requires permit applicants to
undertake specific projects, but simply requires applicants to fund project off-site).
42. Id. (discussing Koontz's actions after refusing to agree to either of Dis-
trict's proposed concessions).
43. FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2013) (stating requirements for relief); see also
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (citation omitted) (discussing act under which Koontz
sought relief). The Florida Supreme Court granted the District's motion to dis-
469
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to the Florida State Supreme Court, which considered the interpre-
tation of the Nollan-Dolan standard.44 The Florida State Supreme
Court distinguished this case from Nollan and Dolan, finding that
(1) the District denied the permit because of Koontz's refusal to
make concessions rather than approving the permit with conditions
and (2) there is no taking when the demand is for money as op-
posed to real property.45
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
District argued no taking occurred because the government did not
take any of Koontz's property, either physically or through an ardu-
ous regulation. 46 The estate of Coy Koontz, Sr. (Koontz) argued
that both the payment of funds to improve land and conceding sev-
enty-five percent of his land to the District were exactions subject to
the heightened standard of scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.47 The Su-
preme Court agreed with Koontz, holding that the requirements of
Nollan and Dolan must be satisfied when the government denies a
permit, even if the demand is for money, as long as it is connected
to an "identifiable property interest."48
miss on the basis that Koontz failed to "exhaust[ ] his state-administrative" reme-
dies. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. However, the Florida District Court of Appeal for
the Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court affirmed
on the grounds that construction surrounding the parcel "seriously degraded" the
property and that Koontz offered to give almost seventy-five percent of his prop-
erty to the District. Id. The trial court relied on the Nollan-Dolan test to conclude
that Koontz's payments for improvements of offsite lands "lacked both a nexus and
rough proportionality to the environmental impact of the proposed construction,"
holding that the District's actions were "unlawful" under Nollan and Dolan. Id.
(citation omitted).
44. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593-94 (citation omitted) (discussing Florida Su-
preme Court decision). For a further discussion of the Nollan-Dolan test, see infra
notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
45. Id. (citation omitted) (discussing Florida Supreme Court's distinction be-
tween Nollan and Dolan).
46. Brief for Respondent, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.
Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447), at *23-24 (arguing that Nollan-Dolan test is
inapplicable).
47. Brief for Petitioner, Koontz v. St.Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct.
2586, 2591 (2013) (No. 11-1447), at *11-15 (arguing that Nollan and Dolan created
exception to Takings Clause in that both cases recognize takings when conditions
are imposed on land-use permits).
48. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (stating holding of case). The Court stated that
it "expresses no view on the merits of petitioner's claim that respondent's actions
here failed to comply with the principles set forth in this opinion and those two
cases" and remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court for further action
consistent with its opinion in this case. Id.
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III. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court in Koontz considered an application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine under the Takings Clause
analysis and found the government's actions amounted to a taking
of Koontz's property.49 This section will discuss the relevant back-
ground information necessary to understand the Supreme Court's
decision in Koontz.5 0 Section A will discuss the Takings Clause gen-
erally.51 Section B will discuss the Supreme Court's application of
the Takings Clause to land use permits. 52 Section C will address
how monetary exactions have been interpreted as takings under the
Fifth Amendment.53
A. Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."5 4 This clause, known as the Takings Clause, aims
"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be born by the
public as a whole."55 The Takings Clause is most relevant within
the context of land use planning; specifically, the ability of state and
local governments to engage in land use planning through the
power of eminent domain has been recognized as constitutional
under their police powers.56
Although the traditional application of the Takings Clause in-
volves the government's physical intrusion or direct appropriation
49. Id. at 2594-2603 (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine cases,
monetary exactions cases, and regulatory takings cases).
50. For a narrative analysis of Koontz, see infra notes 124-184 and accompany-
ing text.
51. For a general background of Takings Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes
54-74 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of land permit jurisprudence, see infra notes 75-92 and
accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of monetary exactions as takings, see infra notes 93-123
and accompanying text.
54. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (stating eminent domain power of government).
55. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (discussing Takings
Clause's purpose). The Supreme Court has described this particular application
of the Takings Clause on various occasions, stating, for example, in Dolan v. City of
Tigard: "A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
56. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926)
(holding state and local governments may use police power to enact ordinances
and regulations for purpose of public welfare).
471
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of private property, the Supreme Court has also recognized govern-
ment regulations can amount to takings within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, beginning with its decision in Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon.57 Despite the relatively straightforward language of the
Takings Clause, its interpretation can be mystifying, especially when
applied to government regulations.58 Regulatory takings are of par-
ticular importance in understanding how the Court finds govern-
ment actions as takings when physical property is not taken per se.59
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' opinion in Mahon is generally
viewed as the foundational case for the Court's interpretation of
regulatory takings and recognizes that property owners must be
compensated when a regulation has the effect of a taking that goes
"too far."60 In Mahon, a state law restricted the mining of coal be-
cause it often caused the land above the mine to sink.61 The Su-
preme Court held that while the regulation did not physically take
the land, " [t] o make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating and destroying it."62
Justice Holmes' opinion laid the framework for regulatory tak-
ings, but lacked a workable definition for a regulation that goes
"too far."63 In Penn Central Transportations Company v. New York
57. See 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding government regulations effectuate tak-
ings); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S 528, 537 (2005) (citations
omitted) (discussing Court's inclusion of regulatory actions within meaning of
Fifth Amendment); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (pointing out Court has not always recognized that Fifth
Amendment governs regulatory takings). For a review of other preeminent cases
that address definitional concerns of regulatory takings, see generally, Loretto v. Tel-
eprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979);
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); LouisvilleJoint Stock Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
58. Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory Takings
Junsprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 63, 63-64 (2008) (discuss-
ing muddled takings clause jurisprudence).
59. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (stating that
when government acts directly to take land, it effectuates taking).
60. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (holding government regulation may effectuate
physical taking); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Mahon). Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that Justice Holmes' opinion in Mahon was "the foundation
of our 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence." Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 508.
61. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13 (discussing provision of Kohler Act). This in-
cluded mining coal for which the landowner inherently owned the coal below the
land's surface. Id.
62. Id. at 415 (recognizing that government regulation can effectuate taking).
63. See Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' jurispru-
dence": The Myth and Meaning ofJustice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
8
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City,6 4 decided fifty-six years after Mahon, the Court fashioned what
Mahon was missing.65 The case began when the New York City Pres-
ervation Commission designated Grand Central Terminal (Grand
Central) as a historical landmark, thereby limiting the ability of
Penn Central Transportation Company (Penn Central), the owner
of Grand Central, to build above it.66 Penn Central alleged the des-
ignation created a regulatory taking because it limited the invest-
ment return on the property.6 7  The Supreme Court held that
designating Grand Central as a historic landmark did not constitute
a taking.68 Most significantly, the Court recognized three factors,
known as the "multi-factor" test, to consider when evaluating regu-
latory takings: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant," (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the charac-
ter of the government action."69
In 2005, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify Takings
Clause jurisprudence by evaluating two types of takings in Lingle v.
Chevron.70 In Lingle, the Court determined two categories to be per
se takings under the Fifth Amendment that fall outside of the Penn
Central framework and require just compensation.71 First, perma-
nent injury caused by a government requirement, no matter how
Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 615-18 (1996) (discussing implications of Mahon deci-
sion); see also D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Im-
pact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69
ALB. L. REv. 343, 343-44 (2005) (discussing generally Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on regulatory takings); Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal
Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1833,
1841 (2010) [hereinafter Kent, Theoretical Tension] (discussing views of regulatory
takings jurisprudence).
64. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (finding that no taking occurred when owners of
Grand Central Terminal were denied right to develop "superadjacent airspace").
65. See id. at 124 (stating Court has not developed formula for regulatory tak-
ings, but some significant factors have emerged).
66. Id. at 115-18 (discussing background of case).
67. See id. at 119-20 (reviewing case's procedural history and Penn Central's
arguments). Penn Central argued that it was limited from using any portion of
Grand Central's airspace. Id. at 136-37. The Court further said that Penn Central
had not been deprived of property because "nothing the Commission has said or
done suggests an intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal." Id.
at 137 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 138 (stating case's holding).
69. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing relevant factors for finding regu-
latory takings).
70. 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (holding that substantial advancement of legiti-
mate state interest was incorrect method for evaluating regulatory takings).
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slight, must be justly compensated.72 Second, in the case of "total
regulatory taking [s]," property must be justly compensated, except
in cases where "'background principles of nuisance and property
law"' by themselves restrict an owner's use of the property.73 The
Lingle categories, along with the test set forth in Penn Central, at-
tempted to fit regulatory takings within the context of traditional
takings so as to make regulatory takings the same as traditional
takings. 74
B. Takings in the Context of Land Use Permits
Together, Nollan and Dolan are arguably the two most signifi-
cant cases that address land use permits in the context of the Tak-
ings Clause and each laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's
decision in Koontz.75 The principles articulated in these two cases
72. See id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 425-35 (1982)). In Loretto, the Court held state law affected a taking when it
forced landlords to allow cable companies to install equipment in apartment build-
ings. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419. The Court noted that "when the 'character of the
governmental action' is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner." Id. at 435.
73. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1026-32 (1992)). Lucas concerned a state law that prohibited owners from build-
ing permanent structures on beachfront property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-09. The
Supreme Court held that regulations that preclude the property owner of "all eco-
nomically viable use of his land" represent a specific category of regulatory takings,
otherwise known as "total regulatory takings," which require just compensation
without the traditional case-by-case application of whether the regulation advances
a public interest. Id. at 1013-19.
74. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (discussing Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central opin-
ions and the cases' common goals). Lingle also firmly stated that applying a Due
Process analysis to takings is inaccurate, clarifying that if a person wishes to chal-
lenge a government regulation as a taking without just compensation, "a plain-
tiff . .. may proceed under one of the other theories . .. by alleging a 'physical'
taking, a Lucas-type 'total regulatory taking,' a Penn Central taking, or a land-use
exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan." Id. at 548. The
Court in Lingle was attempting to undo some disparate applications of the Takings
Clause caused by its decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon and Agins' progeny. See
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980). In Agins, the Supreme Court
stated that a regulation may be a taking "if [it] does not substantially advance [a]
legitimate state interest." Id. at 260. This appeared to be a Due Process analysis
rather than a Takings test, causing some confusion as to what the proper test
should be. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43. The Court held in Lingle that in contrast
to the Mahon, Lucas, and Penn Central tests, "the 'substantially advances' inquiry
reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation
imposes on private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about
how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners." Id. at 542 (em-
phasis in original).
75. See Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the
Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV.
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form what is known as the Nollan-Dolan test for takings analysis; this
test maintains that permit conditions must have an "essential
nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the impact of a construction
or development project.7 6 Nollan and Dolan are of particular impor-
tance to the Supreme Court's decision in Koontz because they estab-
lished the key link between the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and the Takings Clause in the land use permit context.7 7
In Nollan, the Supreme Court considered whether conditions
imposed on a property owner through a land use permit consti-
tuted a taking.78 The Nollans applied for a permit to develop their
beachfront property in Ventura, California; the California Coastal
Commission granted the permit on the condition that the Nollans
"allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their prop-
erty."79 The Court held that granting the permit with the afore-
mentioned condition constituted a taking, and required the
Commission give the Nollans just compensation for their taken
property because of the lack of an "essential nexus" between the
condition of the permit and the building restriction.80 The Com-
mission improperly conditioned the permit in exchange for a pub-
725, 730-31 (2007) (discussing impact of Nollan and Dolan); see also Koontz v. St.
John's River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598-2603 (2013) (incorporating
monetary exactions into framework of Nollan-Dolan); see also Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 518 (2012) (discussing exactions
jurisprudence in Nollan-Dolan).
76. See generally Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requir-
ing an essential nexus); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring
rough proportionality).
77. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (finding government's imposed condition con-
stituted taking because property owners did not have opportunity to receive just
compensation for land); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (discussing applicability of uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine to Takings Clause).
78. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (stating case's issues).
79. Id. at 827-28 (discussing Commission's decision to grant Nollans' permit).
The Nollans' permit application proposed building a three-bedroom house and
demolishing the existing structure. Id. at 828. The Commission reasoned that an
easement was necessary for beachgoers to access the cove more easily. Id. Despite
the Nollans' protestations, the Commission granted the permit with the public
easement condition. Id. The Commission's reasons for requiring the easement
were that residential buildings would block the public from "psychologically," "re-
alizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit,"
thereby burdening the public right to be on the beach. Id. at 828-29 (citations
omitted).
80. See id. at 835-37 (finding imposition of condition unconstitutional). The
Nollan Court found that the Commission's condition went too far and thus fell
outside what is a constitutionally permissible exercise of the state's police powers.
Id. at 837. The Supreme Court did not define what "essential nexus" meant until
Dolan, where it specifically stated that it meant to replace the more malleable "rea-
sonable relationship" test in favor of a more difficult test for governments to meet.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (discussing Nollan).
475
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lic easement to avoid paying the Nollans just compensation for
their land.81 The Court, therefore, found that a taking occurs when
the government conditions a land use permit without establishing
an "essential nexus" between the condition and the permitted pro-
ject, emphasizing the need to protect against government extortion
of property owners.82
The Supreme Court modified Nollan's "essential nexus" test in
Dolan by further requiring conditions on permits to have a "rough
proportionality" to the proposed development, meaning there must
be a substantial "degree of connection between the exactions and
the protected impact of the proposed development."8 3 In Dolan, a
landowner applied for a permit to increase the size of her business
and build a parking lot.84 Because of a nearby creek's one hundred
year floodplain, the City Planning Commission conditioned the
permit on the owner dedicating sufficient land for a "greenway," as
well as areas for pedestrian bike paths.85 The Commission argued
that the permit conditions were substantially related to the impact
of the proposed development, as the property fell within the
planned zone for the Central Business District and the Community
Development Code, and thus had sufficient "rough proportional-
ity" to the proposed development.86 The Court rejected this no-
tion, finding that for an "essential nexus" to exist, there must be a
81. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-37 (recognizing that taking occurred and Nollans
must be compensated).
82. Id. (establishing essential nexus test when conditioning land permits).
The Supreme Court articulated that "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."' Id. (citation
omitted).
83. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391 (discussing issue to be decided). The Dolan
Court further noted that it was "not required to reach this question in Nollan,
because [it] concluded that the connection did not meet even the loosest stan-
dard." Id.
84. Id. at 379 (describing purpose of Dolans' permit).
85. Id. at 379-80 (describing conditions of permit).
86. Id. at 375, 377-82 (discussing City's plans for area and requirements of
Community Development Code). Tigard, Oregon had adopted a plan to decrease
traffic congestion in the Central Business district by building pedestrian pathways
and bicycle paths. Id. at 377. In addition, the city adopted a "Master Drainage
Plan" to make sure that there were no buildings or structures in the floodplain and
to minimize potential flood damage. Id. at 378. The Commission made the follow-
ing findings regarding the connection between the conditions and the impacts of
the Dolans' project: (1) "'[it is reasonable to assume that customers and employ-
ees of the future uses of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adja-
cent to this development for their transportation and recreation needs,'" and (2)
"required floodplain dedication would be reasonably related to [Dolan's] request
to intensify the use of the site given the increase in the impervious surface." Id. at
381-82 (citation omitted).
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"rough proportionality . . . that the [easement] is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."8 7
Though an exact mathematical proportion is not necessary, a mu-
nicipality must make an "individualized determination" of the relat-
edness of the permit conditions to the development.88
The Dolan opinion recognized takings in a land use permit set-
ting as a part of unconstitutional conditions doctrine jurispru-
dence. 9 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a "well-
settled" area of law that maintains "the government may not require
a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government."90 In Dolan, for
example, had the government taken the Dolans' land directly,
rather than through a condition imposed on a land use permit,
there would have been no question that a per se taking occurred.'9
The city, however, imposed a condition on the Dolans' permit,
which was equally unconstitutional because the permit condition
effectively took the land and denied just compensation to the
Dolans.92
C. Monetary Exactions and Takings
The Supreme Court did not establish blanket recognition of
monetary confiscations as takings until its decision in Koontz. 93
Prior to Koontz, the Court rarely recognized that the confiscation of
87. Id. at 386, 391 (finding that best term to describe relationship between
condition and development is "rough proportionality").
88. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (discussing what "rough proportionality" inquiry
should include).
89. Id. at 385 (discussing applicability of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
90. Id. (discussing limits placed on government through unconstitutional
conditions doctrine); see also Perry v. Snidermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (find-
ing that professor's First Amendment right would be violated if public college did
not renew his contract due to his open criticism of school's administration); Mem'1
Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 257 (1974) (holding that county's one-year
residency requirement for indigent sick to receive healthcare was burden on right
to travel). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the government may not
deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right." Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1997). See also Rum-
sfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)
(recognizing Supreme Court's jurisprudence on unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
91. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-82 (describing permit condition and process).
92. Id. at 385 (stating reasons for finding application of unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine).
93. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598-2603
(2013) (holding that Nollan-Dolan must be satisfied even when money is demanded
rather than physical property).
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liens or income accrued in an interest-bearing manner was a tak-
ing. 94 Until Koontz, moreover, there was little agreement among
federal and state courts on whether to apply Nollan-Dolan to permits
requiring monetary exactions in lieu of a specific property
interest.9 5
The most relevant discussion of monetary exactions as takings
is in the extremely splintered plurality opinion of Eastern Enterprises
v. ApfeL96 In Eastern Enterprises, a plurality of the Supreme Court
held that the Coal Act, which imposed retroactive financial liability
on a former coal company for benefits for retired miners, was arbi-
trary due to the high payments the government assessed, and found
that the act effectuated a taking.97 The precedential value of East-
ern Enterprises is limited by the lack of a clear majority, but Justice
Kennedy's concurrence holds greater weight than the other opin-
ions.98 Some scholars see his concurrence as creating a "second
94. For a discussion on takings involving confiscation of liens and income
accrued in an interest-bearing account, see infra notes 93-123 and accompanying
text.
95. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 518-24 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(finding arbitrary financial liability was taking); see also United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 121-22 (1985) (holding that requiring property
owner to obtain permit before use is not a taking); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548
F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) , abrogated by Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586, (finding
Penn Central is proper test applied to local ordinance requiring new development
to install specific storm pipes, rather than Nollan-Dolan test). Making things even
more complicated, state courts have come to a variety of decisions on this issue
with no clear standard emerging. See N. Ill. Home Builders Assn. v. County of Du
Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390-391 (Ill. 1995) (finding impact fee statute unconstitu-
tional); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983) (holding legislature's
adopted impact fees were uninvolved); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton and the
Miami Valley v. Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 1999) (holding "rational nexus
test" applicable to decide whether impact fee was taking); Home Builders Ass'n of
Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 2002) (rec-
ognizing impact fees as taxes rather than takings); Town of Flower Mound v. Staf-
ford Estates Ltd. Partnership, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2011) (deciding town's
condition of monetary payment attached to permit approval was taking).
96. 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding that arbitrary retroactive
law violated Takings Clause). The plurality, comprised of Justices O'Connor,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, found that the Coal Act's imposition of financial
obligations constituted a taking and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. Justice
Thomas filed a concurrence. Id. Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter, Gins-
berg and Breyer joined, filed a dissent. Id. In addition, Justice Breyer filed an-
other dissenting opinion, with which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id.
Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, which some suggest is a
"cross-cutting majority." Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the Dissent Creates the
Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 207,
216 (2008) (discussing case and various opinions).
97. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537-38 (discussing Takings Clause applicability).
98. See Barton H. Thompson, The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REv.
1261, 1261-65 (2000) (noting Court's decision had little value with respect to
precedent).
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majority," averring "the Takings Clause is implicated by statutory or
'ordinary' obligations to pay money that does not operate on spe-
cific identifiable property interests."99
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy criticized the application
of the Takings Clause rather than the Due Process Clause and ar-
gued that the Takings Clause should be applied only to financial
obligations that "operate upon or alter an identified property inter-
est." 00 While Justice Kennedy recognized that the Court's case-by-
case application in regulatory takings is open-ended, "one constant
limitation has been that in all of the cases where the regulatory tak-
ing analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest
has been at stake."10 1 In the opinion of Justice Kennedy, there
must be something more than just a requirement to do some activ-
ity or make a payment for a taking to occur, and the character of
the government action must be a central focus. 10 2 Several other
cases illustrate Justice Kennedy's idea that there must be an "identi-
fiable property interest" to effectuate a taking.103 In Armstrong v.
United States,104 for example, the Supreme Court recognized that
liens were property interests and were compensable when they have
"every possible element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking' and [are]
99. Reznick, supra note 75, at 729 (discussing second majority created by jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence); see also Thompson, supra note 98, at 1261 (discussing
limited precedent of Eastern Enterprises decision). Some courts and commentators
have recognized this second majority in finding that the Takings Clause only ap-
plies to identifiable property interests. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting court must follow ma-
jority in Eastern Enterprises, which recognized regulatory actions are not takings if
requiring payment of funds); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Inter-
connectedness of Property, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 349 n.87 (1998) (affirming Supreme
Court's five to four decision in Eastern Enterprises, which recognized application of
Takings Clause only to specific property interests); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Retaking the
Field: The Constitutional Constraints on Federal Legislation That Displaces Consent Decrees,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 53, 95-96 (1999) (stating that if contract does not affect property
interest, it would fall outside of Takings Clause).
100. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 539-40 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (stating he would have invalidated Coal Act based on Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
101. Id. at 541 (finding that nebulous nature of regulatory takings compels
this view).
102. Id. (describing limited circumstances under which takings should be rec-
ognized when government demands property that is not physical property).
103. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 50 (1960) (holding that gov-
ernment's diminution of value of liens was compensable property interest); Louis-
ville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (finding bank
deprived of property when government forced it to allow mortgagors to keep prop-
erty at reappraised rate); Palm Beach Cnty. v. Cove Club Investors Ltd., 734 So.2d
379, 380 (Fla. 1999) (holding that income from land is interest in real property).
104. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
479
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not a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory
measure."105
In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Ltd.,106 the
Court shed some light on how to apply the Nollan-Dolan test to mon-
etary exactions imposed by permits by suggesting that its holdings
in Nollan and Dolan did not preclude recognizing monetary exac-
tions and user fees as takings under the Fifth Amendment. 07 The
Court noted in dicta that it had "not extended the rough-propor-
tionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions -
land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the
dedication of property to public use."10 Del Monte Dunes has be-
come an important precipice for state courts deciding whether to
recognize user fees as takings under Nollan and Dolan.09
In addition, the Court recognized in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith" 0 that the confiscation of money not related to a
physical property interest may still constitute a taking when the
money is connected to any property interest.'11 In that case, the
court clerk in a Florida state court deducted interest on a complaint
of interpleader.11 2 In addition to deducting a fee "for services ren-
105. Id. at 48 (describing reasons for finding lien to be compensable property
interest).
106. 526 U.S. 687 (1998).
107. See, e.g., id. at 702-03 (stating in dicta that it has not recognized applica-
tion of Dolan "rough-proportionality" test beyond land-use exactions and finding
that challenge in present case was inapplicable to Nollan-Dolan test); see also J.
David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus": How State and Federal Courts
have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where they Should Go From Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 373, 388-90 (2002) (discussing application of Nollan and Dolan in state and
federal courts and impact of Del Monte Dunes dicta on federal and state court deci-
sion-making).
108. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702 (explaining in dicta extent of Dolan pro-
portionality test).
109. See, e.g., Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 689-92, 697
(Colo. 2001) (en banc) (refusing to apply Nollan and Dolan to $4,000 "plant invest-
ment fee" on residential development project); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton v.
City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 353-55 (Ohio 2000) (finding little distinction
between physical demand for property and impact fees affecting property interests
based on Nollan-Dolan test); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, Ltd., 135
S.W.3d 620, 635-36, 645 (Tex. 2003) (finding heightened scrutiny of Nollan-Dolan
test applied to monetary demands).
110. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
111. See id. at 164-65 (holding that interest accrued on interpleader fund for
county court services, in addition to fee collected for those services, was taken with-
out just compensation, violating Fifth Amendment); see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (finding interest income payment confiscation of
private property).
112. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 156-57 (stating facts of case and
procedural history). In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, the interpleader contained the
purchase price of $1,812,145.77. Id.
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dered," the clerk also deducted the interest that had accumulated
in the account." 3 The Supreme Court found that because the
principle amount deposited was private property, the interest ac-
crued was also property because it is an "incident[ ] of owner-
ship."114 The Court further explained that "a State . . . may not
transform private property into public property without compensa-
tion, even for the limited duration of the deposit in court. This is
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment was meant to prevent." 1 5
The Court subsequently affirmed that interest payments are
property interests in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. 16 Phil-
lips dealt with Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA)
program.11 7 The Court held that interest accumulated in an ac-
count is the "private property" of the client because "any interest
that does accrue attaches as a property right incident to the owner-
ship of the underlying principal."" Although the Court remanded
the issue of whether a taking occurred, it affirmed the proposition
that interest payments are property interests.119 The Supreme
Court and other state courts have relied on the decisions in Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies and Phillips in recent cases involving similar
facts.120
113. See id. at 156-58 (stating interest earned while held by clerk exceeded
$90,000 and that amount not turned over brought total amount to over $100,000).
114. Id. at 164 (holding interest earned on account is private property be-
cause it was generated from original amount). The Court found that the county
could not "recharacteriz[e] the [funds] as 'public money' because [they are] held
temporarily by the court." Id.
115. Id. at 164 (stating holding of case).
116. 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (finding that interest income is property interest of
owner).
117. Id. at 160 (discussing IOLTA account). The program mandates that an
attorney receiving client money must place the funds in an individual, interest-
bearing account. Id. This account also needed to be a federally authorized "Nego-
tiable Order of Withdraw," or NOW account, which allows for "federal insurance
banks to pay interest on demand deposits." Id. at 161 (discussing Negotiable Or-
der of Withdraw accounts). The interest income IOLTA generated is paid to the
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) and is not attributed to the
individual client if (1) he or she has no choice but to place his or her funds in the
account and (2) he or she fails to indicate who will receive the interest payments.
Id. at 162-63.
118. Id. at 168 (emphasis in original) (finding that interest income is private
property).
119. Id. at 172 (expressing no view on whether state "took" funds or just com-
pensation, but affirming that generated interest was private property of owner of
principal).
120. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-39 (2003)
(holding confiscation of escrow was taking); Palm Beach Cnty. v. Cove Club Inves-
tors Ltd., 734 So.2d 379, 383-84 (Fla. 1999) (finding income received from fee was
481
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The common thread that ties the foregoing cases together is
their recognition that monetary exactions are related to property,
whether it be physical or not.121 This recognition primed the Su-
preme Court to recognize explicitly that monetary exactions are
compensable property interests under the Takings Clause.122 The
Court used this precedent to form the basis of its opinion in Koontz,
expanding the Nollan-Dolan test to apply to monetary exactions im-
posed as a condition for permit approval.123
V. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's opinion in Koontz, authored by Justice
Alito, is complex and multi-faceted. 124 The Court first used the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine to contextualize why the govern-
ment's demands implicate the Takings Clause and why a taking
occurs in Koontz even though none of Koontz's property was physi-
compensable property right). Moreover, the Court has consistently adhered to the
precedent of County of Mobile v. Kimball, as it has declined to extend takings clause
jurisprudence to taxes and user fees. See Cnty. of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691,
703 (1881). The Supreme Court noted in Kimball
Taxation only exacts a contribution from individuals of the State or of a
particular district, for the support of the government, or to meet some
public expenditure authorized by it, for which they receive compensation
in the protection which government affords, or in the benefits of the spe-
cial expenditure. But when private property is taken for public use, the
owner receives full compensation. The taking differs from a sale by him
only in that the transfer of title may be compelled, and the amount of
compensation be determined by a jury or officers of the government ap-
pointed for that purpose.
Id.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has also found takings where a tax could have
been enacted instead of a monetary exaction, as was the case in Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington finding that no regulatory taking occurred and therefore
no just compensation could be awarded. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235-39.
121. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 518-24 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that taking of money must be sufficiently connected to property
interest); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44-49 (1960) (finding lien is
property interest); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
164 (1980) (stating that principal deposit is property interest); Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that because principle amount is
property interest, interest attaches and becomes part of that interest); Palm Beach
Cnty. v. Cove Club Investors Ltd, 734 So.2d 379, 383-84 (1999) (holding confisca-
tion of income from land compensable property interest).
122. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598-2603
(2013) (holding monetary exactions are compensable property interest when gov-
ernment demanded exactions under Takings Clause and must satisfy Nollan-Dolan
test).
123. Id. (relying on precedent to apply Nollan-Dolan test to monetary exac-
tions imposed as permit condition).
124. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Koontz, see infra notes 125-184
and accompanying text.
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cally taken.12 5 The Court then applied the Takings Clause jurispru-
dence of monetary exactions within the context of unconstitutional
conditions to expand the scope of Nollan and Dolan, finding that
the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" test must be met
even if a permit is denied or the demand is for money rather than
physical property.126
A. Unconstitutional Conditions: Building the Framework
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for its decision by rec-
ognizing that Nollan and Dolan "involve a special application" of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine that protects property owners
from uncompensated takings under the Fifth Amendment.' 27 The
Court was therefore able to find that Nollan and Dolan apply to both
approvals and denials of permits. 128 The importance of the Court's
use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot be under-
stated, as it was the vehicle for finding that the government's ac-
tions constituted a taking of Koontz's property because the
government did not award Koontz just compensation for his
land. 129
The requirements of an "essential nexus" and a "rough propor-
tionality" balanced the principles of Takings Clause jurisprudence
while allowing owners to develop their property.s 0 The Court
stated that Nollan and Dolan demonstrate two important aspects of
the land permit process.' 3 ' First, property owners seeking a land
use permit are "especially vulnerable" to intimidation.132 The un-
constitutional conditions doctrine protects against government
abuse of its "broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far
more than property it would like to take."' 3 3 The doctrine hinges
125. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598-2603 (using unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as basis for decision).
126. See id. at 2603 (stating case holding).
127. Id. at 2594 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005))
(discussing Nollan-Dolan application).
128. See id. (extending Nollan-Dolan application to permit denials).
129. See id. at 2595-97 (finding Koontz was unable to realize Fifth Amendment
benefit that guarantees of receiving just compensation for his land).
130. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595-97 (discussing Nollan-Dolan test). The Koontz
Court further explained that "the government may choose whether and how a
permit applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development,
but it may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental
ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts." Id.
131. Id. at 2594 (discussing permitting process).
132. Id. (discussing nature of land permits).
133. Id. (positing that unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides check to
government's discretion to deny permits). The Court went on to say that "[b]y
483
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on the valuable nature of land use permits, which the Court states
are worth more than the just compensation an owner would receive
through a taking, resulting in "extortionate" demands from the gov-
ernment. 34 Second, the Court recognized that the permit process
is a way to balance the interest of the property owner with the po-
tential threat to the public.135
The Court then found that these two principles of the land
permit process do not change when a government approves or de-
nies a permit involving a condition.136 The Court reasoned that if
the government's denial of a permit were not subject to the Nollan-
Dolan test, it "would enable the government to evade ... [its] limita-
tions simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions pre-
cedent to permit approval."137 In stating that the Court has never
distinguished between "conditions precedent and conditions subse-
quent," the Court asserted that it has never made a distinction be-
tween conditions imposed before and conditions imposed after a
permit has been awarded.138 Because the Court treats these condi-
tions equally, it rejected the government's contention that an out-
right denial would not have been subject to the Fifth
Amendment.139 The Court stated that inflated "demands for prop-
erty in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings
Clause not because they take property but because they impermissi-
bly burden the right not to have property taken without just
compensation." 14 0
B. Monetary Exactions and Identifiable Property Interests
After finding that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine ap-
plies in Koontz and that Koontz was denied opportunity to receive
conditioning a building permit on the owner's deeding over a public right-of-way,
for example, the government can pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up
property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just compensa-
tion." Id.
134. Id. at 2594-95 (stating property owners are likely to surrender to de-
mands of government as long as permit is worth more than just compensation for
land).
135. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (stating conditions may be warranted when
substantial impact on public occurs due to property development).
136. Id. (holding Nollan and Dolan applies even when permit is denied).
137. Id. (discussing issues that would arise if Nollan and Dolan was inapplica-
ble to permit denials).
138. Id. at 2596 (discussing past cases on unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
139. Id. (stating government's assertion that outright denial would not be sub-
ject to Takings Clause is problematic).
140. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (discussing why government cannot outright
deny permit without being subject to Takings Clause).
20
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just compensation for his property, the Court next turned to the
issue of the government's demand for money rather than for a por-
tion of the property for an easement. 1 4 1 The Court found that
monetary payments as conditions for land use permits were "func-
tionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions."' 42 The
Court drew particular attention to Justice Kennedy's assertion in
Eastern Enterprises that "the Takings Clause does not apply to govern-
ment-imposed financial obligations that 'd[o] not operate upon or
alter an identified property interest.' "143
Despite the fact that the demand was for money rather than
property, the Supreme Court found there was an identifiable con-
nection to property in the payment of that money.144 Here, the
Court affirmatively applied Justice Kennedy's "identifiable property
interest" analysis from Eastern Enterprises to monetary exactions.145
The incorporation of Justice Kennedy's analysis was based on the
inseparable relationship between the government's demand for
money and the property at stake in Koontz.14 6 The Court reasoned
that regardless of whether the government is demanding money or
property, the same concerns underlying Nollan and Dolan are pre-
sent.147 It noted:
[T]he risk that the government may use its substantial
power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue
governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough
proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of
the specific property at issue, thereby diminishing without
justification the value of the property.148
The Supreme Court thus held that a monetary demand results
in a per se taking "similar to the taking of an easement or lien."' 49
The Court relied on Takings Clause jurisprudence that involve
141. Id. at 2598 (discussing government's demand for money).
142. Id. at 2599 (holding that monetary exactions are subject to Nollan and
Dolan essential nexus and rough proportionality test).
143. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 948, 540
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing monetary exactions).
144. Id. (applying case to Justice Kennedy concurrence).
145. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2600 (incorporating Eastern Enterprises into
Fifth Amendment monetary exactions analysis).
146. Id. at 2600 (stating pivotal part of case is connection between funds and
property).
147. Id. (justifying Nollan and Dolan application).
148. Id. (discussing risk of government abuse if Nollan and Dolan not
applied).
149. Id. (finding that transfer of property interest from owner to government
in Koontz is similar to takings that in occurred Nollan and Dolan).
485
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monetary exactions to support its holding, specifically citing to Arm-
strong, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Phillips, and Palm Beach, as well as
state court decisions that have come to a similar conclusion.150 The
Nollan and Dolan tests, therefore, now apply to monetary exactions
the government demands where there is an identifiable property
interest sufficiently connected to that monetary exaction.' 5 '
C. Takings, Not Taxes
The Court further addressed the dissent's concern that land
use exactions and property taxes would be indistinguishable. 152
The Court clearly stated that takings are not taxes and that lower
courts should not confuse the two concepts. 53 The Court rejected
viewing taxes as takings and clarified that Koontz does not affect the
ability of local governments to collect taxes.154 First, the court
noted takings should be distinguished from taxes because of the
"long-settled view that property the government could constitution-
ally demand through its taxing power can also be taken by eminent
domain."'ss Second, the Court cited to precedent and stated that
takings and taxes are clearly distinguishable in practice.156
D. The Dissent: Show Me the Property
Justice Kagan's dissenting opinion rejected the application of
Nollan and Dolan to conditions demanding money rather than phys-
ical property, reasoning an "ordinary obligation to pay money" is
not a taking because it does not impact a specific and identifiable
150. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2601 (relying on precedent to conclude that
demands for money can result in taking just as demands for property resulted in
taking in Nollan and Dolan).
151. Id. at 2600 (stating that regardless of government policy consideration,
there is still property interest transferred when government demands money).
152. Id. (discussing concerns of lower court and dissent). The dissent posed
the question, "[O]nce the majority finds decides that a simple demand to pay
money - the sort of thing often viewed as a tax - can count as an impermissible
'exaction,' how is anyone to tell the two apart?" Id. at 2607 (Kagan,J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2601 (relying on Brown to show that it would be implausible to
argue government was exercising power to levy taxes when taking property, as leg-
islatures impose taxes, not courts).
154. Id. (discussing prior case law on taxes and takings).
155. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601 (stating that Koontz Court's holding is consis-
tent with prior cases).
156. Id. at 2600-01 (explaining that need to differentiate between takings and
tax cases is problem in Court's assertion that government could constitutionally
demand property through taxes or eminent domain).
22
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property interest.15 7 The dissent recognized that the permit pro-
cess was an essential part of local governance and community devel-
opment; however, by applying monetary exactions to Takings
Clause jurisprudence, the Nollan-Dolan test would need to be ap-
plied in every permit approval or denial.' 58 The subject of disagree-
ment came from the majority's extension of Nollan and Dolan to
include conditions demanding money rather than just physical
property.'59
The dissent's primary concern was the majority's application of
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Eastern Enterprises.o60 The dissent did
not agree that an "ordinary liability to pay money" is a taking be-
cause monetary obligations do not impact a "specific and identi-
fied" property interest.161 Relying on Justice Breyer's dissent in
Eastern Enterpises, the Koontz dissent found that while the demand
for funds will certainly decrease Koontz's net worth, it is no differ-
ent than any other government demand for money that has an "ad-
verse economic effect."' 6 2 Accordingly, the dissent argued the
order to pay money to repair the wetlands in Koontz, taken sepa-
rately from the permit, was not a taking, and therefore did not im-
plicate the Nollan-Dolan test because there was no surrender of a
constitutional right. 63
The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on cases charac-
terizing liens or seizures of interest income as takings; it found
these cases inapplicable because Koontz had no identifiable prop-
erty interest similar to the property interests implicated with respect
to a lien or a confiscation of money.16 4 Koontz, the dissent argued,
was only ordered to spend money; therefore, this could not be con-
sidered a taking given that his "liability would have been the same
157. Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority on issue of
Nollan and Dolan application to case when permit is approved or denied with con-
dition, either precedent or subsequent).
158. Id. at 2607 (citations omitted) (discussing potential impact of majority
decision).
159. Id. (discussing how dissent diverges from majority).
160. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2606 (finding that while Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion is controlling, majority incorrectly applied it).
161. Id. (disagreeing with majority opinion that any of Koontz's property was
physically taken).
162. Id. (citation omitted) (pointing out that government imposes many costs
on individuals, which do not constitute takings).
163. Id. (finding no taking occurred and Nollan-Dolan test does not need to be
applied).
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whether his property produced income or not."165 For these rea-
sons, the dissent found that there was no "specific and identifiable"
property interest.166
Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority's decision ex-
tends the Takings Clause too far.167 The dissent asserted that the
majority allowed for too much federal supervision of local activities:
"The Federal Constitution thus will decide whether one town is
overcharging for sewage, or another is setting the price to sell li-
quor too high. And the flexibility of state and local governments to
take the most routine actions to enhance their communities will
diminish accordingly."16 8 Further, the Court's failure to explain
how local and state governments should apply Koontz could be po-
tentially problematic in future cases.169
In her dissent, Justice Kagan stated that she would have af-
firmed the Florida Supreme Court's judgment on two grounds:o70
First, "the District never demanded that Koontz give up anything
(including money) as a condition for granting him a permit."17'
After a recitation of Koontz's permitting process, the dissent found
that the government made no monetary demand as a condition to
an approved permit.172 Rather, the government gave Koontz a vari-
ety of options to adhere to state law.' 73 Despite the opportunity to
abide by state law, Koontz chose not to obtain the permits and the
government's denial "therefore did not result [in a taking due to]
his refusal to accede to an allegedly extortionate demand or condi-
tion."'74 The dissent concluded that after this decision, the only
option for local governments to avoid litigation will be to "'deny
165. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2606 (pointing out proposed development did not
affect order demanding monetary payment).
166. Id. (citation omitted) (finding no property interest at stake in case).
167. Id. at 2607 (citations omitted) (arguing that with no limits Takings
Clause will become unnecessarily overbroad).
168. Id. (positing that decision will have detrimental effects).
169. Id. at 2608 (pointing out majority refusal to set forth clear standards to
analyze user fees).
170. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2609 (stating why dissent would affirm Florida Su-
preme Court's decision).
171. Id. (stating one reason Justices dissented).
172. Id. at 2610-11 (discussing how government made no specific demand or
condition).
173. Id. (discussing Koontz's options to adhere to state law).
174. Id. at 2611 (noting new limitations on government in evaluating permit
applications). The dissent articulated that Koontz's "unwillingness to correct [his
permits applications] by any means" coupled with the "legal deficiencies" of the
application resulted in permit denial. Id. at 2611 (emphasis omitted).
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the permits outright"' and refuse to give advice as to how to con-
form to the law.175
Second, the dissent reasoned that "no actual taking occurred,
[and therefore] Koontz [could not] claim just compensation even
had the District made a demand." 7 6 The dissent argued that al-
though it understood the majority's decision to remand damage
considerations to the state court, it was perplexed that the majority
found a taking in this case.17 7 The dissent was puzzled as to how "a
law authorizing damages only for a 'taking' [could] also provide
damages when . . . no taking has occurred" and was doubtful that
the state of Florida would recognize such a remedy.17 8
The majority opinion in Koontz squarely addressed each of the
dissent's concerns.' 79 First, the majority cited to multiple state
court decisions that applied the Nollan-Dolan test to monetary exac-
tions. 8 0 In these jurisdictions, local governments had not been
precluded from assessing reasonable fees for permits.' 8 Second,
the majority highlighted the inconsistency of the dissent's view that
the Federal Constitution will now need to be applied in every local
governmental decision regarding land permits and will not apply
any "meaningful limits" on the land permit process. 82 The major-
ity articulated how, despite this purported lack of constitutional
limits, the dissent noted several limitations the federal Constitution
imposes on land permit fees and rejected the notion that "other
constitutional doctrines leave no room for the nexus and rough
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan."'8 5 According to
the majority, to say that land permit applicants need no more pro-
175. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2611 (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011) rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013)) (discussing
negative impact on local government).
176. Id. at 2609 (stating second reason for dissenting from majority).
177. Id. at 2611-12 (asserting its confusion as to how majority found a taking).
178. Id. (arguing Koontz should not have been able to seek damages for tak-
ing when no taking occurred).
179. See id. at 2602-03 (majority opinion) (describing shortcomings of
dissent).
180. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2602 (citations omitted) (stating that local govern-
ments have already been applying Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions).
181. Id. (disagreeing with dissent's argument that local governments will be
unable to assess user fees).
182. Id. (identifying inconsistency of dissent's opinion).
183. Id. at 2602-03 (rebutting dissent's argument that Nollan and Dolan are
not required to takings in land permit context).
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tection from the government would require overruling Nollan and
Dolan.184
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Koontz represents a significant turning point for Takings Clause
jurisprudence because it recognized that monetary exactions may
be considered takings if they are sufficiently tied to a property inter-
est.185 The Supreme Court, however, may have been inconsistent
in its application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, spe-
cifically when addressing the government's argument that Koontz's
permit could have been denied outright. 86 Moreover, the Court's
adoption ofJustice Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern Enterprises and
broad expansion of the Nollan-Dolan test may have a serious prece-
dential impact on the future of Takings Clause jurisprudence.1 87
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court's application of
cases involving lien and income interest confiscation to those in-
volving user impact fees is of great concern, as it may negatively
impact the way local governments exercise discretion in approving
or denying development plans.188
A. Expansion of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine in
the Context of Outright Permit Denials
The Court's unanimous agreement that the Nollan-Dolan test
applies to conditions on approvals and denials of permits is particu-
larly significant.189 The question as to whether conditions on per-
mit denials should receive the same level of scrutiny as conditions
on permit approvals remained unanswered until the Koontz deci-
184. Id. at 2602 (rejecting dissent's suggestion that regulatory takings doc-
trines provide limits on Federal Constitution, as there would be no need for Nollan-
Dolan test).
185. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2600 (finding that Nollan-Dolan applies to land
use permits requiring money). For an analysis of the Court's application of the
Nollan-Dolan test to government demands for money, see supra notes 127-140 and
accompanying text.
186. Id. at 2597 (discussing unconstitutional conditions doctrine). For an
analysis of the Court's application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
user impact fees, see supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 2599-2600 (applying Justice Kennedy's "specific property interest"
framework to land use permits). For an analysis of the Court's broad application
ofJustice Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern Enterprises, see supra notes 141-148 and
accompanying text.
188. Id. at 2600-02 (applying analysis from monetary exactions to user impact
fees). For an analysis of the Court's application of monetary exactions to user
impact fees, see supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of the significance of Koontz in the context of outright
permit denials, see infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
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sion. 9 .0 The Koontz analysis suggests that outright denials of per-
mits receive the same scrutiny under the Nollan-Dolan test, despite
the fact that no conditions would be imposed in those situations.19'
The majority accepted the proposition that an outright denial
of a permit would be a taking without considering that such a de-
nial does not impose any conditions on the property owner.' 92
While the majority saw an outright denial as analogous to other un-
constitutional conditions cases, the dissent suggested that outright
denials may be different.s93 The majority's failure to explain why
an outright denial fits into the framework of Nollan-Dolan is prob-
lematic: if a local government or planning board denies a permit
without any mention as to why the permit was denied or what could
be done for the permit application's approval, then there is argua-
bly no condition imposed and therefore no taking.194 As such, the
outright denial does not necessarily fit into the majority's "govern-
ment extortion" analysis because there is no condition imposed
that forces the property owner to do anything. 95 The dissent's ar-
gument, however, that the District's permit denial in Koontz did not
impose any such conditions on the property owner does not fit
within the context of unconstitutional conditions because condi-
tions were explicitly imposed, pending the denial of the permit.196
Conditions were, in fact, imposed because Koontz's permit denial
was conditioned on choosing one of two mitigation proposals. 97
The Court affirmatively stated that Nollan and Dolan apply to
permit denials as well as approvals.' 98 It failed, however, to fully
explain how this framework includes outright denials.'99 Thus, the
Court's wide expansion of Nollan-Dolan without a proper explana-
190. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591 (holding that Nollan-Dolan test must be ap-
plied to conditions of permit denials as well as conditions on permit approvals).
191. See id. at 2611 (Kagan,J., dissenting) (warning against dangers of expan-
sion of Nollan and Dolan).
192. See id. at 2596 (majority opinion) (dismissing claim that District could
have denied permit outright).
193. See id. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding that had District denied
applications, Penn Central test would have been appropriate to determine whether
taking occurred).
194. See id. (discussing outright denials of permits).
195. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95 (majority opinion) (stating conditions on
land use permits may lead to government's extortionate demands).
196. Id. at 2610-11 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding no conditions were im-
posed on Koontz in this case).
197. See id. at 2592-93 (majority opinion) (explaining two possible proposals
Koontz could agree to in order to develop property).
198. See id. at 2594-96 (applying Nollan-Dolan test to permit denials).
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tion of how outright denials fit into Takings Clause jurisprudence is
a key shortcoming of the majority opinion and may be a difficult
hurdle for lower courts applying this case. 200
B. Recognition of the Kennedy Concurrence in Eastern
Enterprises
One of the essential parts of the Court's holding that monetary
fees assessed in a land use permit are takings is the majority's appli-
cation of Justice Kennedy's "specific and identified property inter-
est" analysis from Eastern Entepises.201 In finding that the demands
for money in this case were connected to an "identified property
interest," the Court recognized this language as a standard for eval-
uating whether monetary exactions can be considered takings. 2 02
The Court appropriately used Justice Kennedy's analysis from East-
ern Enterprises in Koontz. 203
The dissent's criticism that the majority misapplied Justice
Kennedy's test from Eastern Enteprises in Koontz runs contrary to the
Court's previous recognition of such takings with respect to liens
and interest income. 204 The majority's finding that a user fee re-
quirement serves the same purpose as a relinquishment of real
property dispels the dissent's assertion that monetary exactions can-
not be considered an "identifiable property interest."205 The Court
has held in numerous circumstances that types of monetary inter-
ests are indeed takings; by extending that logic to monetary exac-
tions, a user fee that is sufficiently connected to the property is
deemed to be something affecting that property.206 The Court's
200. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (stating outright denials fall into unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine without explanation).
201. Id. at 2599-2600 (applying Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern
Enterpises).
202. Id. (finding monetary obligations had sufficient connection to property
interest and was a taking).
203. See id. 2599-2602 (analogizing liens and interest income to monetary
exactions).
204. See id. at 2600 (comparing liens and interest income to monetary exac-
tions); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 50 (1960) (finding diminished
value of liens by government compensable property interest); Palm Beach Cnty. v.
Cove Club Investors Ltd, 734 So.2d 379, 383-84 (1999) (finding income generated
from property compensable interest); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., v. Beck-
with, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (holding interest income valid property interest);
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (finding income confis-
cated by government taking and compensable property interest).
205. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2600 (finding that requiring money in lieu of
relinquishment of physical property is "functionally equivalent").
206. See id. at 2599-2600 (holding demands for money amount to per se tak-
ing); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-39 (2003) (holding mone-
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application of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern Enterprises,
therefore, is consistent with the Court's prior holdings and appro-
priately incorporates Justice Kennedy's concurrence into modern
Takings Clause jurisprudence. 207
C. The Key Question Left Unanswered: Was Koontz's Property
Taken?
The crux of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent is whether Koontz's property was taken.208 The Court used
the "identified property interest" test in Eastern Enterprises as the ba-
sis for finding that the monetary takings in Armstrong and Palm
Beach are sufficiently similar to Florida's demand for money in
Koontz. 209 While this approach allowed the Court to find that there
was a "direct link" between the government's demand and the
property, it confused the difference between the demands in East-
ern Enterprises and those in Armstrong, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Phillips, and Palm Beach.210 Eastern Enterprises concerned a demand
for money with no reference to any physical property interest,
whereas Armstrong, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Phillips, and Palm
Beach all concerned a recognizable property interest, such as a lien
or earned interest from a sum of money - arguably different inter-
ests.21 1 Justice Kennedy's concurrence stated that the government-
imposed financial obligations " [do] not operate upon or alter an
tary confiscation in form of escrow as taking); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524
U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding monetary confiscation as taking); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc., v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (finding government's con-
fiscation of interest generated from income as taking).
207. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2602 (finding liens and interest income are
analogous to monetary exactions).
208. See id. 2610-11 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing no taking occurred).
209. See id. at 2599-2600 (majority opinion) (finding Justice Kennedy's Eastern
Enterprises holding similar to government taking liens or interest income).
210. See id. at 2599-2601 (discussing application of Eastern Enterprises to lien
and monetary confiscations); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding Takings Clause is inapplicable to government
demands for money when there is no "identified property interest"); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44-49 (1960) (finding government's taking of lien re-
quires just compensation); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (holding income interest is property interest and subject to
Takings Clause when taken without just compensation); Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (finding confiscation of income interest is tak-
ing); Palm Beach Cnty. v. Cove Club Investors Ltd., 734 So.2d 379, 383-84 (1999)
(holding confiscation of income from land is taking).
211. CompareE. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (stating gov-
ernment-imposed financial obligations is not taking unless it affects property inter-
est), with Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 46 (finding lien is compensable property interest),
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164 (holding property interest is implicated
when government confiscated income interest), Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172 (finding
493
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identified property interest," not that the obligation must be the
identified property interest.212 The differences between these cases
are readily apparent.213 The Court's application of Eastern Enter-
prises to other cases involving monetary confiscations blurs the line
between monetary confiscations that are tied to a property interest
with those that are not, thereby creating a broad new standard that
only requires that a monetary confiscation have a "direct link" to a
property interest. 214
Moreover, the dissent's assertion that no property interest was
taken or identified in Koontz further frustrates the Court's analy-
sis.215 In the cases the majority relied upon, the property interest
was what was being taken.216 In Koontz, however, the Court finds
that the government's demand for money must be sufficiently re-
lated to a property interest, not that the government's demand for
money is the property interest at issue.217 While the government's
demand is tied to a property interest, the Court confuses what the
property interest is in Koontz by redefining what is a "property
interest. "218
VII. IMPACT
Koontz affects not only Takings Clause jurisprudence, but also
state and local governments' decision-making and the environ-
ment.2 19 The Court's broad interpretation of Nollan and Dolan
leads to an application of the Takings Clause for both monetary
confiscations, as well as physical property. 220 Additionally, the
interest earned on principal is property), and Palm Beach, 734 So.2d at 389 (hold-
ing income from property is sufficient property interest).
212. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating Takings
Clause should be applied when government demand is for money).
213. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2600 (discussing monetary confiscation takings
cases).
214. See id. at 2600 (finding Nollan-Dolan must apply because of "direct link"
between property interest and government demand).
215. Id. at 2606 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding no government demand con-
nected to property interest in this case, only order to spend money).
216. Id. at 2599-2601 (majority opinion) (stating property at issue here is
physical property, but finding government demand for money is violation of Tak-
ings Clause).
217. Id. at 2600 (finding Takings Clause is applied when there is direct con-
nection between government's demand and real property).
218. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2601 (discussing application of Eastern Enter-
prises to other takings cases involving confiscation of money or liens).
219. See id. at 2594-2603 (discussing applicable Takings Clause jurisprudence,
recognizing monetary exactions as takings, and addressing concerns of environ-
mental impact and decision's effect on state and local government).
220. Id. (holding monetary fees can be considered takings).
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Court's incorporation of Eastern Enterprises into this context may
have negative implications for state and local governments applying
Koontz to land use permit applications.221 Moreover, Koontz may
have a lasting environmental impact, especially with regard to
wetlands. 222
A. Impact on Takings Jurisprudence
The significance of Koontz in the context of Takings Clause ju-
risprudence is its broad application of the Nollan-Dolan test to mon-
etary exactions required for land use permits.22 3 By requiring
monetary exactions to pass the Nollan-Dolan "essential nexus" and
"rough proportionality" test, Koontz definitively incorporated mone-
tary exactions into Takings Clause jurisprudence. 2 2 4 While the
Court attempted to narrow its holding by stating that the govern-
ment-demanded monetary exaction must have a "direct link" to a
physical parcel of land, it begins a new discussion of what consti-
tutes a justly compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.225
Although the Supreme Court ruling was needed to address the
growing concern of how to apply monetary exactions to takings, the
broad ruling in Koontz may have foreclosed other types of analysis
for these types of claims.226 Some commentators have suggested
that because monetary exactions in a Takings Clause context touch
on many different areas of the law, the most appropriate applica-
tion would be a hybrid framework using the Nollan-Dolan "essential
nexus" and "rough proportionality" test in concert with the multi-
factor balancing test of Penn Central.227 In contrast, there are also
strong arguments in favor of recognizing monetary exactions within
the sole context of Nollan and Dolan.228 First, monetary exactions
221. Id. at 2598-2601 (applying Nollan-Dolan test to land permits requiring fi-
nancial obligation and using Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern Enterprises
for support). For a discussion as to how Koontz will impact Takings Clause jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 223-232. For a discussion on the potential effects of Koontz
on state and local governments, see infra notes 233-251.
222. For a discussion on the environmental side effects of the Koontz decision,
see infra notes 252-259.
223. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599-2601 (applying Nollan-Dolan test).
224. See generally id. (discussing application of Nollan-Dolan test).
225. See, e.g., id. at 2600 (stating Court's holding in Koontz rests on "direct
link" between government demand and real property interest).
226. See, e.g., Kent, Theoretical Tension, supra note 63, at 1874-75 (arguing hy-
brid application of Nollan-Dolan test and multi-factor Penn Central test would be
most appropriate way to analyze development impact fees as takings).
227. Id. at 1876-79 (discussing hybrid approach).
228. See, e.g., Jane C. Needleman, Note, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When Nol-
Ian and Dolan Should be Triggered, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 1563, 1584 (2006) (arguing
Nollan and Dolan should be applied to monetary exactions); Michael L. Nadler, The
495
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impose the same risks as physical exactions identified in Nollan and
Dolan: Monetary exactions "leverag[e] and redistribution of
wealth." 229 By applying the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Do-
lan, the rule will apply evenly to both monetary and physical takings
by the government. 230 Second, monetary exactions fit within the
principal goal of the Takings Clause to ensure that the government
does not force individuals to bear losses that the public as a whole
should bear.23' In fact, "monetary exactions, by their very design,
force developers [rather than private citizens] to fund public ser-
vices and infrastructure that may benefit and be used by a broader
segment of the population than is injured by their development."232
B. Impact on Local and State Governments
The dissent feared that Koontz would negatively impact state
and local governments by recalibrating the balance between the
rights of the property owner and the needs of a local govern-
ment.233 Moreover, the dissent predicted that development might
be stymied by the majority's decision due to its potential to en-
courage outright denials of permits rather than discussions and ne-
gotiations from which both sides can benefit.2 3 4
Therefore, redefining the "level of the burden" on a property
owner's right to receive just compensation after Dolan's extension
of constitutional protection "increases the level of justification
Constitutionality of Community Benefits Agreements: Addressing the Exactions Problem, 43
URB. LAw 587, 600-01 (2011) (arguing monetary exactions should fall within scope
of Nollan and Dolan because monetary exactions have same risks as physical
exactions).
229. Nadler, supra note 228, at 600 (citation omitted) (discussing benefits of
interpreting monetary exactions within Nollan-Dolan context); see also Vicki Been,
"Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 504 (1991) (arguing municipalities will over-
charge developer for harm imposed by developer's actions for purpose of redistri-
bution of wealth and "over regulate" to raise revenues).
230. Nadler, supra note 228, at 600 (discussing why monetary exactions
should be included in Nollan-Dolan framework).
231. See id. (arguing monetary exactions fit within one of key goals of Takings
Clause); see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (discussing
goals of Takings Clause).
232. See Nadler, supra note 228, at 600 (footnote omitted) (explaining how
monetary exactions can benefit public in positive way).
233. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2610-11 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing potential impact on local and
state governments).
234. See id. at 2610 (discussing why governments might choose to deny per-
mits outright after decision).
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needed to restrict the use and benefits of property rights."23 5 In
assessing the impact of the Nollan and Dolan decisions, commenta-
tors observed that the Supreme Court was taking a strong position
on protecting the rights of property owners.2 3 6 Specifically, the in-
crease in constitutional safeguards for property rights restricts the
availability of land use conditions, regulations, and mandates on a
variety of real estate developments. 23 7 This limitation occurs in
three ways: "increasing (1) the level of the burden imposed on the
right to receive just compensation, (2) the level of constitutional
protection accorded property rights, and (3) the level of judicial
scrutiny in determining whether sufficient justifications exist for
the imposition of land dedication conditions and other land use
regulations."2 3 8 Given the impact of Nollan and Dolan on property
rights, the Supreme Court's extension of these cases to monetary
exactions further increases those protections and may prove to in-
crease the burden on the government to demonstrate that the pro-
posed exactions are within an "essential nexus" of the development
and "roughly proportional" to its impact.239
Legislators in Florida have reacted to Koontz by introducing leg-
islation that reinforces protection for landowners seeking land use
permits. 240 The proposed legislation, House Bill 1077 and Senate
Bill 1310, would limit local governments from including additional
requirements on permit applicants "beyond those issued by state
and federal agencies." 241 One commentator, Robert Thomas,
235. James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Land Dedication Conditions and Be-
yond the Essential Nexus: Determining "Reasonably Related" Impacts of Real Estate Develop-
ment under the Takings Clause, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 73, 135 (1996) (concluding
property owners will have more justification when government restricts property
rights in land use permits).
236. Id. (discussing heightened constitutional protections for property rights
after Nollan and Dolan).
237. Id. (discussing impact on development).
238. Id. (footnotes omitted) (noting three reasons Dolan achieves result of
increasing constitutional protections and limiting conditions on development); see
also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1416
(1989) (discussing Warren Court's reemergence of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
239. See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586 (recognizing monetary exactions
within context of Nollan and Dolan).
240. See Bruce Ritchie, Bills Would Expand on U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Rlor-
ida Property "Takings" Case, The Florida Current (Feb. 27, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://
www.thefloridacurrent.com/article.cfm?id=36631840 (discussing new legislation
proposed in Florida in response to Koontz).
241. Id. (stating purpose for proposed legislation). The legislature would
provide further protection for landowners who are "vulnerable to excessive de-
mands for relinquishment of property or money in exchange for planning and
permitting approvals." Fla. SB 1310 § 70.45.
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noted that "[this] legislation also would make it less likely, in my
opinion, that a local government or municipality will try to test any
boundaries that the Koontz decision left open."2 4 2 The legislation,
moreover, would further reinforce the burden on local govern-
ments to meet the Nollan-Dolan test.24 3
Koontz may also encourage municipalities to deny permits out-
right, without a discussion of how a property owner can conform
his or her development to public needs.244 These decisions may
push local governments to bypass negotiations on permits and sim-
ply deny those permits that fail to meet certain standards and,
therefore, stifle development that may have a positive impact on a
local community. 245 The dissent suggests that potential lawsuits
may scare local government officials into either denying a permit
outright or allowing developers to build without any restrictions.2 4 6
Local governments have already begun to feel the impact of
Koontz despite its recent inception. 247 In San Diego, for example,
the city council considered enacting a five hundred percent in-
crease on a "linkage fee" levied on construction projects that assist
low-income workers by subsidizing housing costs. 2 4 8 Opposition
groups such as the "Jobs Coalition," a local organization comprised
of building associations and Chamber of Commerce groups, had
retained legal counsel and would have sought to fight this fee, if it
had been implemented. 249 A land use attorney in San Diego com-
mented: "[Koontz] raised the bar for what municipalities have to do
242. Ritchie, supra note 240 (discussing further protections Florida legislation
would provide to property owners).
243. See id. (noting that legislation would limit local or municipal govern-
ments from pushing the limits of Koontz).
244. See id. at 2590 (stating outright denials would be subject to Nollan-Dolan
scrutiny, but failing to explain how this would apply).
245. W. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 346
(Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (discussing outright denials).
246. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (analyzing potential im-
pact on local governments).
247. See, e.g., Editorial: Court Ruling a Blow to Land Use Collaboration, SACRA-
MENTO BEE (June 27, 2013), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitol-alert-insider-edi-
tion/2013/06/editorial-court-ruling-a-blow-to-land-use-collaboration.html
(arguing majority has made local government protection of community more diffi-
cult after Koontz); Andrew Keatts, Linkage Fee Opponents Want to Take Down San Di-
ego's - and Everyone Else's, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Oct. 3, 2013), http://
voiceofsandiego.org/2013/10/03/linkage-fee-opponents-want-to-take-down-san-
diegos-and-everyone-elses/ (discussing potential application of Koontz in San Diego
City Council's consideration of five hundred percent increase of fee on construc-
tion projects for subsidized housing).
248. Keatts, supra note 247 (discussing potential linkage fee imposition in San
Diego).
249. Id. (examining local organization's reactions to potential fees).
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to justify a fee."2 5 0 Challengers to the measure were victorious in
their challenge, but it will remain to be seen how this will affect
other municipalities.2 5 1
C. Potential Environmental Impact
Koontz may have a great impact on the physical environment
based on the limitations it puts on local governments. 252 After Nol-
lan and Dolan, commentators predicted that local governments
would be less likely to impose monetary exactions relating to "recre-
ational, environmental, or natural resource amenities," leading lo-
cal governments to under-regulate environmental impacts.253 The
consequences of using these exactions less frequently in the mitiga-
tion of environmental impacts "could mean a loss of open space,
fewer bike paths and nature trails, and less wetlands and habitat
protection." 2 5 4 Ann E. Carlson and Daniel Pollak, two scholars on
this subject, point out that although local governments can use the
police power to alleviate environmental impacts of proposed devel-
opment, the precision of the "essential nexus" and "rough propor-
tionality" requirement may make this "difficult to quantify."255
Commentators have warned about the effects of increasing
safeguards for property owners and making land use regulations
more difficult. 256 If local governments fail to assess environmental
impact fees or exactions on developers due to fears of litigation,
250. Id. (quoting San Diego attorney Felix Tinkov on impact of recent Su-
preme Court decision).
251. See Developer Fee Rescinded By San Diego City Council, KPBS, (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2014/mar/04/linkage-fee-rescinded-san-diego-city-
council/ (discussing San Diego City Council's unanimous rejection of construc-
tion fee increase due to concerns for local economy and employment).
252. Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme
Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decision, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
103, 117-18 (2001) (discussing impact of Nollan and Dolan on local governments
and environmental mitigation); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory For-
mulas: Exactions and the Consequences ofClanty, 92 CAL. L. REv. 609, 660 (2004) (find-
ing Takings Clause jurisprudence may adapt to environmental changes
inadequately and result in adverse environmental effects).
253. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 252, at 107 (discussing research results
relating to local governments' imposition of exactions after Nollan and Dolan); see
also Fenster, supra note 252, at 660 (discussing local and state governments'
underregulation).
254. Carlson & Pollak, supra note 252, at 156 (predicting consequences of
using exactions less frequently).
255. Id. at 136 (discussing local governments' difficulty to state environmental
impact in context of Nollan and Dolan test).
256. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2686 (2013)
(holding monetary exactions can be takings if Nollan-Dolan test is met).
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future harms to the environment may be seriously discounted. 25 7
As Mark Fenster explains, "A constitutional logic leading to regula-
tory formulas that cannot adapt to local, regional, and national en-
vironmental changes ultimately provides greater individual
property rights than the Constitutional requires, and as a result ad-
versely affects political, social, and environmental values made vul-
nerable to the entitlements these formulas create."258 Koontz will
certainly give pause to local governments seeking to mitigate the
environmental impact of development in their communities.259
Catheine Contino*
257. See Fenster, supra note 252, at 660 (discussing environmental problems
of underregulation).
258. Id. (discussing local government's difficulty to understand and apply
Takings Clause jurisprudence).
259. See Carlson & Pollack, supra note 252, at 660 (noting potential effects on
local communities).
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Political Sci-
ence, 2012, The Ohio State University; B.A., History, 2012, The Ohio State
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